Historical reconstruction of inaccessibility status in Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Borno and Yobe States, Nigeria, 2010-2020.

Introduction: ultimately detected in 2016, wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission continued undetected after 2011 in Northeast Nigeria Borno and Yobe States in security-compromised areas, inaccessible due to armed insurgency. Varying inaccessibility prevented children aged <5 years in these areas from polio vaccination interventions and surveillance, while massive population displacements occurred. We examined progress in access over time to provide data supporting a very low probability of undetected WPV circulation within remaining trapped populations after 2016. Methods: to assess the extent of inaccessibility in security-compromised areas, we obtained empirical historical data in 2020 on a quarterly and annual basis from relevant polio eradication staff for the period 2010-2020. The extent of access to areas for immunization by recall was compared to geospatial data from vaccinator tracking. Population estimates over time in security-compromised areas were extracted from satellite imagery. We compared the historical access data from staff with tracking and population esimates. Results: access varied during 2010-2020, with inaccessibility peaking during 2014-2016. We observed concurrent patterns between historical recalled data on inaccessibility and contemporaneous satellite imagery on population displacements, which increased confidence in the quality of recalled data. Conclusion: staff-recalled access was consistent with vaccinator tracking and satellite imagery of population displacments. Despite variability in inaccessibility over time, innovative immunization initiatives were implemented as access allowed and surveillance initiatives were initiated to search for poliovirus transmission. Along with escape and liberation of residents by the military in some geographic areas, these initiatives resulted in a massive reduction in the size of the unvaccinated population remaining resident.

Deployment of novel oral polio vaccine type 2 under emergency use listing in Nigeria: the rollout experience.

In 2011, a dedicated consortium of experts commenced work on the development of the novel oral poliovirus vaccine type 2 (nOPV2). After careful and rigorous analysis of data to enable early, targeted use of the vaccine, World Health Organization´s (WHO´s) Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE) reviewed data from accelerated clinical development of nOPV2 and endorsed entering assessment under WHO´s Emergency Use Listing (EUL) procedure. In November 2020, nOPV2 received an interim recommendation for use under EUL to enable rapid field availability and potential wider rollout of the vaccine. In December 2020, Nigeria initiated preparation to meet all criteria for initial use of nOPV2 in the country and the documentation process to verify meeting them. The process entailed addressing the status of meeting 25 readiness criteria in nine categories for nOPV2 use in Nigeria for response efforts to ongoing cVDPV2 outbreaks. During January-February 2021, Nigeria submitted the required documentation for all required indicators for nOPV2 initial use. In February 2021, the country obtained approval from the GPEI nOPV2 Readiness Verification Team to introduce nOPV2 and in March 2021, rolled out the novel vaccine in mass vaccination campaigns for outbreak response in Bayelsa, Delta, Niger, Sokoto and Zamfara states, and one area council in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The lessons learned from this rollout experience in Nigeria are being applied as the country streamlines and strengthens the nOPV2 rollout process across the remaining states.

Progress Toward Poliomyelitis Eradication - Nigeria, January 2018-May 2019.

The number of wild poliovirus (WPV) cases in Nigeria decreased from 1,122 in 2006 to six WPV type 1 (WPV1) in 2014 (1). During August 2014-July 2016, no WPV cases were detected; during August-September 2016, four cases were reported in Borno State. An insurgency in northeastern Nigeria had resulted in 468,800 children aged <5 years deprived of health services in Borno by 2016. Military activities in mid-2016 freed isolated families to travel to camps, where the four WPV1 cases were detected. Oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) campaigns were intensified during August 2016-December 2017; since October 2016, no WPV has been detected (2). Vaccination activities in insurgent-held areas are conducted by security forces; however, 60,000 unvaccinated children remain in unreached settlements. Since 2018, circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) has emerged and spread from Nigeria to Niger and Cameroon; outbreak responses to date have not interrupted transmission. This report describes progress in Nigeria polio eradication activities during January 2018-May 2019 and updates the previous report (2). Interruption of cVDPV2 transmission in Nigeria will need increased efforts to improve campaign quality and include insurgent-held areas. Progress in surveillance and immunization activities will continue to be reviewed, potentially allowing certification of interruption of WPV transmission in Africa in 2020.

Progress Toward Poliomyelitis Eradication - Nigeria, January-December 2017.

Nearly three decades after the World Health Assembly launched the Global Polio Eradication Initiative in 1988, four of the six World Health Organization (WHO) regions have been certified polio-free (1). Nigeria is one of three countries, including Pakistan and Afghanistan, where wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission has never been interrupted. In September 2015, after >1 year without any reported WPV cases, Nigeria was removed from WHO's list of countries with endemic WPV transmission (2); however, during August and September 2016, four type 1 WPV (WPV1) cases were reported from Borno State, a state in northeastern Nigeria experiencing a violent insurgency (3). The Nigerian government, in collaboration with partners, launched a large-scale coordinated response to the outbreak (3). This report describes progress in polio eradication activities in Nigeria during January-December 2017 and updates previous reports (3-5). No WPV cases have been reported in Nigeria since September 2016; the latest case had onset of paralysis on August 21, 2016 (3). However, polio surveillance has not been feasible in insurgent-controlled areas of Borno State. Implementation of new strategies has helped mitigate the challenges of reaching and vaccinating children living in security-compromised areas, and other strategies are planned. Despite these initiatives, however, approximately 130,000-210,000 (28%-45%) of the estimated 469,000 eligible children living in inaccessible areas in 2016 have not been vaccinated. Sustained efforts to optimize surveillance and improve immunization coverage, especially among children in inaccessible areas, are needed.

Continued Endemic Wild Poliovirus Transmission in Security-Compromised Areas - Nigeria, 2016.

On August 10, 2016, 2 years after the most recent wild poliovirus (WPV) case was reported in Nigeria (in July 2014) (1), two WPV cases were reported in the northeastern state of Borno, which has been severely affected by insurgency-related insecurity since 2013. On September 9 and 26, 2016, two additional WPV cases were reported in Borno in children whose families migrated from security-compromised, inaccessible areas of the state. All four cases were WPV serotype 1 (WPV1), with genetic differences indicating prolonged undetected transmission. A large-scale emergency response plan was developed and implemented. The plan initially called for vaccination of 815,791 children during August 15-18 in five local government areas (LGAs) in the immediate vicinity of the first two WPV cases. Subsequently, the plan was expanded to regionally synchronized supplementary immunization activities (SIAs), conducted during August 27-December 6 in five Lake Chad basin countries at increased risk for national and regional WPV1 transmission (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria). In addition, retrospective searches for missed cases of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP), enhanced environmental surveillance for polioviruses, and polio surveillance system reviews were conducted. Prolonged undetected WPV1 transmission in Borno State is a consequence of low population immunity and severe surveillance limitations associated with insurgency-related insecurity and highlights the risk for local and international WPV spread (2). Increasing polio vaccination coverage and implementing high-quality polio surveillance, especially among populations in newly secured and difficult-to-access areas in Borno and other Lake Chad basin areas are urgently needed.

Containment of Ebola and Polio in Low-Resource Settings Using Principles and Practices of Emergency Operations Centers in Public Health.

Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) have been credited with driving the recent successes achieved in the Nigeria polio eradication program. EOC concept was also applied to the Ebola virus disease outbreak and is applicable to a range of other public health emergencies. This article outlines the structure and functionality of a typical EOC in addressing public health emergencies in low-resource settings. It ascribes the successful polio and Ebola responses in Nigeria to several factors including political commitment, population willingness to engage, accountability, and operational and strategic changes made by the effective use of an EOC and Incident Management System. In countries such as Nigeria where the central or federal government does not directly hold states accountable, the EOC provides a means to improve performance and use data to hold health workers accountable by using innovative technologies such as geographic position systems, dashboards, and scorecards.

Environmental Isolation of Circulating Vaccine-Derived Poliovirus After Interruption of Wild Poliovirus Transmission - Nigeria, 2016.

In September 2015, more than 1 year after reporting its last wild poliovirus (WPV) case in July 2014 (1), Nigeria was removed from the list of countries with endemic poliovirus transmission,* leaving Afghanistan and Pakistan as the only remaining countries with endemic WPV. However, on April 29, 2016, a laboratory-confirmed, circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) isolate was reported from an environmental sample collected in March from a sewage effluent site in Maiduguri Municipal Council, Borno State, a security-compromised area in northeastern Nigeria. VDPVs are genetic variants of the vaccine viruses with the potential to cause paralysis and can circulate in areas with low population immunity. The Nigeria National Polio Emergency Operations Center initiated emergency response activities, including administration of at least 2 doses of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) to all children aged <5 years through mass campaigns; retroactive searches for missed cases of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP), and enhanced environmental surveillance. Approximately 1 million children were vaccinated in the first OPV round. Thirteen previously unreported AFP cases were identified. Enhanced environmental surveillance has not resulted in detection of additional VDPV isolates. The detection of persistent circulation of VDPV2 in Borno State highlights the low population immunity, surveillance limitations, and risk for international spread of cVDPVs associated with insurgency-related insecurity. Increasing vaccination coverage with additional targeted supplemental immunization activities and reestablishment of effective routine immunization activities in newly secured and difficult-to-reach areas in Borno is urgently needed.

Progress Toward Poliomyelitis Eradication--Nigeria, January 2014-July 2015.

Since the 1988 launch of global poliomyelitis eradication efforts, four of the six World Health Organization (WHO) regions have been certified polio-free. Nigeria is one of only three countries, along with Afghanistan and Pakistan, where transmission of wild poliovirus (WPV) has never been interrupted. During 2003-2013, northern Nigeria served as a reservoir for WPV reintroduction into 26 previously polio-free countries. In 2012, the Nigerian government launched a national polio eradication emergency plan to intensify efforts to interrupt WPV transmission. This report describes polio eradication activities and progress in Nigeria during January 2014-July 2015 and updates previous reports. No WPV cases have been reported to date in 2015, compared with a total of six cases reported during 2014. Onset of paralysis in the latest reported WPV type 1 (WPV1) case was July 24, 2014. Only one case of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) has been reported to date in 2015, compared with 20 cVDPV2 cases during the same period in 2014. Pending final laboratory testing of 218 remaining specimens of 16,617 specimens collected since January 2015, Nigeria could be removed from the WHO list of polio-endemic countries in September 2015. Major remaining challenges to the national polio eradication program include sustaining political support and program funding in the absence of active WPV transmission, maintaining high levels of population immunity in hard-to-reach areas, and accessing children in security-compromised areas of the northeastern states.

Progress toward poliomyelitis eradication--Nigeria, January 2013-September 2014.

In 1988, the World Health Assembly resolved to interrupt wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission worldwide. By 2013, only three countries remained that had never interrupted WPV transmission: Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Since 2003, northern Nigeria has been a reservoir for WPV reintroduction into 26 previously polio-free countries. In May 2014, the World Health Organization declared the international spread of polio a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. Nigeria's main strategic goal is to interrupt WPV type 1 (WPV1) transmission by the end of 2014, which is also a main objective of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative's Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan for 2013-2018. This report updates previous reports (4-6) and describes polio eradication activities and progress in Nigeria during January 2013-September 30, 2014. Only six WPV cases had been reported in 2014 through September 30 compared with 49 reported cases during the same period in 2013. The quality of supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) improved during this period; the proportion of local government areas (LGAs) within 11 high-risk states with estimated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) campaign coverage at or above the 90% threshold increased from 36% to 67%. However, the number of reported circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) cases increased from four in 2013 to 21 to date in 2014, and surveillance gaps are suggested by genomic sequence analysis and continued detection of WPV1 by environmental surveillance. Interrupting all poliovirus circulation in Nigeria is achievable with continued attention to stopping cVDPV2 transmission, improving the quality of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance, increasing vaccination coverage by strengthened routine immunization services, continuing support from all levels of government, and undertaking special initiatives to provide vaccination to children in conflict-affected areas in northeastern Nigeria.